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I. INTRODUCTION: SOCIAL WELFARE IN THE AGE OF TRUMP, AND
THE LESSONS OF DISABILITY POLICY
The 2016 election has had significant consequences for American
social welfare policy. Some of these consequences are direct. By giving
unified control of the federal government to the Republican Party for
the first time in a decade, the election has potentially empowered
conservatives to ram through a bill to repeal the Affordable Care Act—
the landmark “Obamacare” law that marked the most significant
expansion of the social welfare state since the 1960s. Other
consequences are more indirect. Both the election result itself, and
Republicans’ actions since, have spurred a renewed debate within the
left-liberal coalition regarding the politics of social welfare policy.
† Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I presented earlier versions of this
paper at the Program on Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism at the University of
Pennsylvania and at a faculty workshop at Stanford Law School. Thanks to the participants at
those events, and to the participants at the Cardozo Law Review Symposium, for their very
helpful comments.
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This political debate actually began during the Democratic
primary. In his surprisingly successful insurgent campaign, Bernie
Sanders strongly endorsed social-policy universalism. 1 His signature
policy positions—single-payer health insurance, free college—extended
benefits equally to everyone. 2 The eventual nominee, Hillary Clinton, by
contrast, offered more targeted approaches: means-tested child care and
college tuition plans, an incremental expansion of Obamacare, and so
forth. 3 It is not clear that there was any deep difference—of principle or
of preferred policy tools—between the coalitions Sanders and Clinton
represented. But the dynamics of a contested primary led partisans of
each candidate to develop and articulate competing theories of politics
under which their own candidate’s proposals represented the most
effective way to achieve an expansion of the social welfare state. 4
On each side, the partisans drew on longstanding arguments from
the social policy literature. Sanders partisans thus argued that universal
social welfare policy is more likely to be politically durable, because it
preempts efforts to divide the polity between those who receive benefits
and those who pay for them—or, as House Speaker Paul Ryan (the most
prominent opponent of social welfare programs in American public life)
memorably put it, “makers” and “takers.” 5 They contended that the
Affordable Care Act was politically vulnerable precisely because it
provided its new coverage to poorer people (through the Medicaid
expansion) and those who did not have health insurance through their

1 See, e.g., Anu Partanen, What Americans Don’t Get About Nordic Countries, ATLANTIC
(Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/bernie-sanders-nordiccountries/473385.
2 See Bernie Sanders, Sen., Speech at Georgetown Univ.: My Vision for Democratic
Socialism in America (Nov. 19, 2015) (transcript available at http://inthesetimes.com/article/
18623/bernie_sanders_democratic_socialism_georgetown_speech).
3 See Jonathan Cohn, Clinton Lays out Agenda for Making Child Care Better—and More
Affordable, HUFFPOST (May 10, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hillaryclinton-child-care_us_57313fd7e4b096e9f09275b6; Doug Lederman, Clinton Borrows from
Bernie, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 7, 2016), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2016/07/07/
clinton-proposes-tuition-free-public-higher-education-families-incomes-125000; Vann R.
Newkirk II, Medicare for More, ATLANTIC (May 23, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2016/05/clinton-new-medicare-proposal/483806.
4 For an argument that “[p]rimary campaigns tend to emphasize . . . differences,” and that
the differences between Clinton and Sanders were largely tactical, see David Cole, The
Progressive Case for Hillary Clinton’s Incrementalism, NATION (June 10, 2016), https://
www.thenation.com/article/the-progressive-case-for-hillary-clintons-incrementalism.
5 See Robbie Nelson, Engines of Solidarity, JACOBIN MAG. (Nov. 22, 2016), https://
www.jacobinmag.com/2016/11/donald-trump-democratic-party-welfare-state. On Ryan, see,
for example, Greg Sargent, Paul Ryan Regrets that ‘Makers and Takers’ Stuff. Sort of, Anyway,
WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2016/03/
23/paul-ryan-regrets-that-makers-and-takers-stuff-sort-of-anyway/?utm_term=.69620a90007f.
On the longstanding arguments for the political durability of universal programs, see Samuel R.
Bagenstos, The Meaning of the Civil Rights Revolution: Universalism and Civil Rights (with
Notes on Voting Rights After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2848–49 (2014).
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jobs. 6 A single-payer plan, by contrast, would put all Americans in the
same system and thus give all of them a stake in not having it taken
away. 7
Clinton supporters countered that, however durable large universal
programs may ultimately prove, it is politically far more difficult to get
those programs adopted in the first place except by taking incremental
steps. 8 And, indeed, as some Clinton supporters pointed out, the
famously “universal” programs of the New Deal were anything but.
They often carved African Americans in the South out of their
protections, all to smooth their passage in a divided and compromised
Democratic Congress. 9 In addition to reinforcing existing structures of
racial subordination, those supposedly universal laws also reinforced
subordination in gender relations. 10
After Clinton won the Democratic nomination, she ran in the
general election on a platform that adopted many of Sanders’s
positions. 11 But Clinton never fully embraced social-welfare
6 See, e.g., Kevin Drum, A Follow-Up: Why the Working and Middle Classes Don’t Like
Obamacare Much, MOTHER JONES (Nov. 20, 2014, 4:51 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/
kevin-drum/2014/11/follow-why-working-and-middle-classes-dont-obamacare-much; Andrew
Sprung, Obamacare Is a Boon for the Working Poor, and That’s Probably Good for All of Us,
MOTHER JONES (May 5, 2015, 1:00 PM), http://www.motherjones.com/kevin-drum/2015/05/
obamacare-working-poor (discussing the “good policy/tough politics conundrum” of the
Affordable Care Act).
7 See, e.g., Margaret Flowers, Single-Payer Is Within Reach: What You Need to Know About
the Bill for Improved Medicare for All, TRUTHOUT (June 14, 2017), http://www.truth-out.org/
opinion/item/40932-single-payer-is-within-reach-what-you-need-to-know-about-the-bill-forimproved-medicare-for-all (“Previous efforts at universal health care in the US were stymied by
racism and classism. A single-payer system would create a sense of social solidarity that has not
been experienced in the US. Other countries have figured out that welfare systems are poor
systems and universal systems are higher-quality systems, because each person has a stake in
making them the best that they can be.”).
8 See, e.g., Ed Kilgore, Creating ‘Medicare for All’ Isn’t as Easy as It Sounds, N.Y. MAG.
(May 24, 2016, 7:45 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/05/medicare-for-all-isntas-easy-as-it-sounds.html; Harold Pollack, Here’s Why Creating Single-Payer Health Care in
America Is So Hard, VOX (Jan. 16, 2016, 11:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/2016/1/16/
10779270/pollack-single-payer-in-america; Harold Pollack, Single-Payer Health Care Is More
Popular than Ever. Here Are 10 Questions for Its Future, VOX (May 23, 2016, 8:20 AM), https://
www.vox.com/2016/5/23/11703190/single-payer-questions. See generally Jonathan Cohn,
Hillary Clinton Is a Progressive Democrat, Despite What You May Have Heard, HUFFINGTON
POST (May 8, 2016, 6:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/hillary-clintonprogressive_us_572cca08e4b0bc9cb0469098.
9 IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2013).
10 See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR
ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001); SUZANNE METTLER, DIVIDING
CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL PUBLIC POLICY (1998).
11 See Jonathan Cohn, The Future of America Is Being Written in This Tiny Office,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 21, 2016), http://highline.huffingtonpost.com/articles/en/hillaryclinton-policy-agenda; Katrina vanden Heuvel, The Most Progressive Democratic Platform Ever,
WASH. POST (July 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-most-progressivedemocratic-platform-ever/2016/07/12/82525ab0-479b-11e6-bdb9-701687974517_story.html?
utm_term=.c0e42d4aea6e.
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universalism. And the “establishment” wing of the Democratic Party she
represented remained identified with more targeted and incremental
programs like the Affordable Care Act. When Trump prevailed, and
Democrats focused increasingly on how Clinton had lost many of the
“white working class” voters who had cast ballots for President Obama
in 2008 (if not 2012), many in the party blamed the targeted nature of
Obama-era social welfare policy. 12 And when Trump took quick action
to attempt to undo the Affordable Care Act, the political arguments
against bold universalism suffered another blow. 13
Now, the forces of social-policy universalism seem to have the
momentum in the left-liberal coalition. A consensus is emerging that
the next Democratic president will run on a single-payer health care
platform. 14 Many presumed 2020 Democratic presidential candidates—
including some previously associated with the “establishment” wing—
have now cosponsored Sen. Sanders’s “Medicare for All” bill. 15
Proposals for a universal basic income are gaining traction as well. 16
And free college proposals seem to be gaining support among
Democratic elected officials.
The view that universalism is politically powerful thus seems to be
carrying the day among left-liberals. In this Essay, I want to offer some
12 See, e.g., Catherine Rampell, Why the White Working Class Votes Against Itself, WASH.
POST (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-the-white-workingclass-votes-against-itself/2016/12/22/3aa65c04-c88b-11e6-8bee-54e800ef2a63_story.html
(suggesting that many white working class voters opposed Obamacare, even though they
benefited from it, because they believed that it in fact benefited other, undeserving people);
Joan C. Williams, What So Many People Don’t Get About the U.S. Working Class, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Nov. 10, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/11/what-so-many-people-dont-get-about-the-u-sworking-class (“Remember when President Obama sold Obamacare by pointing out that it
delivered health care to 20 million people? Just another program that taxed the middle class to
help the poor, said the WWC, and in some cases that’s proved true: The poor got health
insurance while some Americans just a notch richer saw their premiums rise.”).
13 See, e.g., Ezra Klein, Republicans Are About to Make Medicare-For-All Much More Likely,
VOX (June 15, 2017, 8:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/15/15787626/
mitch-mcconnell-single-payer-medicare-all; Vann R. Newkirk II, A Political Opening for
Universal Health Care?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/
archive/2017/02/universal-health-care-polls-obamacare-repeal/516504; Reihan Salam, The
Health Care Debate Is Moving Left, SLATE (June 9, 2017, 10:23 AM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/politics/2017/06/how_single_payer_health_care_went_from_a_
pipe_dream_to_mainstream.html.
14 See, e.g., Klein, supra note 13.
15 See Addy Baird, UPDATED: More Democratic Senators Will Co-Sponsor Bernie Sanders’
Medicare for All Bill, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 11, 2017, 4:20 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/
even-more-senators-are-co-sponsoring-sanders-medicare-for-all-bill-1403fcfa1fea/.
16 See Clay Dillow & Brooks Rainwater, Why Free Money for Everyone Is Silicon Valley’s
Next Big Idea, FORTUNE (June 29, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/29/universal-basicincome-free-money-silicon-valley; Ben Schiller, A Universal Basic Income Is the Bipartisan
Solution to Poverty We’ve Been Waiting for, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 16, 2015), https://
www.fastcompany.com/3040832/a-universal-basic-income-is-the-bipartisan-solution-topoverty-weve-bee; James Surowiecki, The Case for Free Money, NEW YORKER (June 20, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/06/20/why-dont-we-have-universal-basic-income.
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reasons to worry about these confident predictions. To be clear, my
skepticism is largely about the politics. I support many of the universal
programs that are part of the emerging left-liberal social policy
consensus, including single-payer health care and a universal basic
income. But I am far less certain that universalism solves the political
problems that left-liberals face in social welfare policy.
I examine these issues through the lens of disability policy.
America’s policy concerning individuals with disabilities has often
wrestled with the choice between universalism and targeting—across a
number of dimensions. As important, many of the key social welfare
policy battles of the Trump Administration are likely to focus on
programs on which disabled people rely. Medicaid, which any Trump
health care plan would likely cut substantially, provides key services to
people with disabilities. 17 During the last two decades in particular,
those services have included crucial supports to enable disabled people
to lead full and independent lives in their own homes and communities,
rather than in nursing homes and institutions. 18 Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)—
the two major cash benefits programs for people with disabilities—also
face a significant threat. Indeed, skepticism of SSDI and SSI has grown
among policy centrists at least since the rolls expanded in the 2008
recession. With unified Republican control of the federal government,
those programs are likely to be the next targets of welfare reform energy.
There is reason to believe, I argue, that the universal, contributory
social insurance programs for people with disabilities—notably, SSDI—
are not likely to be more politically durable than the targeted ones—
notably, Medicaid. 19 In part, this is because of the indeterminacy of the
universalism/targeting distinction. Many social programs that are
commonly characterized as universal could instead be easily understood
as targeted depending on one’s frame of reference. Whether a social
welfare program has the political benefits attributed to universalism
depends on the social meaning of that program, rather than on its
formal rules for eligibility. 20 That social meaning, in turn, depends
crucially on the broader political context, as well as the efforts of
activists to shape the public understanding of the program. In
17 On the importance of Medicaid to people with disabilities, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The
Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 56–70 (2004).
18 See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in THE
HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 227, 238
(Nathaniel Persily et al., eds., 2013).
19 For a persuasive, empirically grounded argument against the supposed political benefits
of universalism in social welfare policy, see CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE WELFARE STATE
NOBODY KNOWS: DEBUNKING MYTHS ABOUT U.S. SOCIAL POLICY 92–108 (2007).
20 This point is one of the underlying themes of my argument in a previously published
Article. See Bagenstos, supra note 5, at 2864–65.
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particular, I will suggest, public debate about social welfare programs
often revolves around questions of citizenship—in particular, whether
receipt of benefits serves as a recognition of one’s status as a full citizen,
or instead whether it stands as an obstacle to citizenship status.
The connection between welfare benefits and social citizenship, of
course, is the central subject of T.H. Marshall’s celebrated work,
Citizenship and Social Class. 21 Writing in postwar Britain, Marshall saw
universal social welfare programs as adding a new dimension to
citizenship—social citizenship. (Marshall in fact devoted most of his
professional life to building the institutions of British social democracy.)
My arguments below often intersect and engage with Marshall’s
influential discussion. One goal of this Essay is to use the disability
context to highlight just how contingent the connection between
universal benefits and social citizenship is. As the disability context
shows, social rights are often deeply in tension with social—and at times
even juridical—citizenship. Social rights, at least in the sense described
by Marshall, have been in tension with citizenship because extensions of
those rights have in certain circumstances been understood to deny full
citizenship to the beneficiaries of those extensions.
This may seem a striking claim. The cross-national trend has been
to treat social rights as basic human rights. So how can those rights deny
full citizenship? And it is true that acceptance of social welfare rights is
no longer treated in the law as in conflict with juridical citizenship
(though this was not always true, and continuing efforts to deny
immigration and naturalization rights to people who rely on welfare
programs demonstrates that acceptance or enjoyment of welfare rights
can in practice conflict with juridical citizenship). But social rights
continue to conflict with full social citizenship. Again, this may seem a
striking claim, as Marshall’s influential account treats enjoyment of
social rights as tantamount to social citizenship. 22 But social citizenship,
as I use the term, implies treatment by society—and not just by
particular legal institutions—as a fully equal member of the
community. 23 And people who accept or use social welfare rights are
often treated, by society at large, as less entitled to participate fully in the
life of the community than those who do not accept those rights. 24 This
denial of full social citizenship often reflects back on the law and leads
T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (1950).
Id. at 8.
23 I defend this understanding in Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social
Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225 (2013).
24 My argument in this regard is much in accord with Joel Handler’s discussion of
“workfare” and “active labor market” policies in the United States and Europe, which he
contends deny full social citizenship to those who receive benefits but cannot work. See Joel F.
Handler, Social Citizenship and Workfare in the US and Western Europe: From Status to
Contract, 13 J. EUR. SOC. POL’Y 229 (2003).
21
22
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program administrators and judges to limit the juridical rights of those
who rely on social welfare.
Those who have advocated expansion of social rights have
therefore been forced to fight a battle on two fronts—to seek that
expansion while at the same time working to ensure that it does not
undermine the equal citizenship status of those who receive expanded
benefits. In Anglo-American law, the disability context has been a prime
theater for this two-front battle. Since at least the time of the 1601
Elizabethan Poor Law, disability has been one of the most widely
accepted bases for claiming social rights. 25 But acceptance of those
disability-specific social rights has long come at a cost to citizenship.
Sometimes the cost has been to juridical citizenship, as acceptance of
welfare has triggered an explicit denial of civil and political rights. But
even when legal limitations of civil and political rights were removed,
acceptance of social welfare benefits deprived people with disabilities of
full social citizenship—of the status as full and equal members of the
community. Those who are excused from the ordinary obligations of
citizenship, such as the obligation to work for a living, are often
understood in the popular imagination to be disentitled to the ordinary
rights of citizenship.
When it organized through the 1970s, the American disability
rights movement thus confronted a dilemma. The movement’s basic
goal was to ensure that people with disabilities were treated as full
citizens—as full and equal members of the community. An expansion of
what had previously been understood as social rights—both in terms of
education, health, and welfare benefits and in terms of disability-specific
accommodations by schools, employers, and other governmental and
economic actors—seemed necessary to achieve that goal. 26 But that very
expansion of social rights would likely serve to underscore public
attitudes that people with disabilities were not entitled to be treated as
full citizens. Disability rights activists sought to fight this dilemma by
working to reframe what had previously been understood as social
rights into civil rights and to reframe what had previously been
understood as welfare dependence into the promotion of independence.
Those reframing efforts were notably, though hardly fully, successful.
The story of those efforts helps to illuminate the complex and fraught
relationship between social rights and citizenship. And it helps to
sharpen understanding of the political possibilities and limitations of
universal social welfare policy in our current political moment.
The remainder of this Essay elaborates on these points. Part II
25 This is one of the basic arguments made in DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE
(1984).
26 See SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 12–33 (2009).

420

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:413

discusses the way that disability has, throughout Anglo-American
history, served as a ticket to social rights—but at the same time as a
barrier to full social citizenship. In Part III, I engage with Marshall’s
argument that universal social programs respond to this problem by
reinforcing social citizenship; I argue that the experience of disability
programs complicates Marshall’s account. In Part IV, I discuss the
limitations of disability rights advocates’ strategies of pursuing social
rights that advance social citizenship. Finally, in Part V, I suggest some
lessons we can draw from this experience for current controversies.
II. DISABILITY AS A TICKET TO SOCIAL RIGHTS, AND OUT OF
CITIZENSHIP
Disability has long been central to the provision of social welfare.
As Deborah Stone writes, “[t]he very notion of disability is fundamental
to the architecture of the welfare state.” 27 For centuries, Anglo-American
law has provided some form of social welfare benefits for at least some
classes of people who could not work. The classes have changed over
time (as has the form the benefits have taken), but disability has
typically been an important criterion on which the law has relied to
identify the inability to work.
Medieval English vagrancy laws, ultimately codified in the
Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, imposed significant restrictions on the
giving and receipt of alms, but those laws made exceptions for
individuals with various conditions that we would now call disability
(such as leprosy, blindness, and mobility impairments). 28 The more
modern Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 (Poor Law) required
recipients of poor relief to live in workhouses. The conditions in the
workhouses were undesirable, as an effort to discourage people from
leaving the workforce to subsist on relief. But that law provided for
better workhouse conditions, and sometimes a complete exemption
from the requirement to live in the workhouse, for several classes of
individuals whom we would now describe as having disabilities: “the
sick,” “the insane,” “defectives,” and “the aged and infirm.” 29 The role of
the disability category under these laws was apparent—to identify, more
or less objectively, a class of people who should be exempt from the
ordinary societal obligation to work for a living. As Marshall described
it, the Poor Law “offered relief only to those who, through age or
sickness, were incapable of continuing the battle, and to those other
weaklings who gave up the struggle, admitted defeat, and cried for
27
28
29

STONE, supra note 25, at 12.
Id. at 35–37.
Id. at 40–48.
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mercy.” 30
As disability welfare entered American law, the disability category
served the same purposes. The first federal disability welfare system in
the United States was probably the Civil War pension program. That
program defined disability—and thus eligibility for benefits—as, in
essence, a medical “condition that restricted the veteran’s ability to
obtain his subsistence by manual labor.” 31 And our current SSDI
program, enacted in 1956, similarly defines disability (at least as a
formal matter) as a physical or mental impairment that renders an
individual unable to engage in any “substantial gainful activity” in the
national economy. 32
One could, of course, identify the inability to work directly, by
examining whether a person has knowledge, skills, and abilities that are
valued by employers. Or one could identify the inability to work in a
more process-oriented fashion, by considering what the person has
done to find or keep a job. But our social welfare system often takes a
third approach by looking for an identifiable disability as a trigger for
determining whether an individual cannot work and thus deserves more
generous benefits. Disability serves this function for two reasons: fault
and fraud. 33 In a market system in which people are supposedly expected
to work to make a living, 34 providing subsistence benefits for those who
are not working is inevitably threatening. If benefits are given to those
who can work but choose not to, they will undermine the market
system. A similar harm to the market system would occur if individuals
could, by their own choices, render themselves unable to work. Taking
these premises of the market system for granted—whether because they
believed in them on the merits or simply recognized them as political
constraints—architects of social welfare programs have therefore sought
to limit coverage to those individuals who are not working due to no
fault of their own, and who can demonstrate that the condition that
makes them unable to work is a genuine one.
Defenders of a limited welfare state have seen the disability
category as important not just in limiting relief but also in authorizing
it—and fending off challenges to the market system from the left. People
of compassion would ask challenging questions about capitalism if the
MARSHALL, supra note 21, at 23.
Peter D. Blanck & Michael Millender, Before Disability Civil Rights: Civil War Pensions
and the Politics of Disability in America, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1, 17 (2000); see also Theda Skocpol,
America’s First Social Security System: The Expansion of Benefits for Civil War Veterans, 108
POL. SCI. Q. 85 (1993).
32 42 U.S.C. § 423(d) (2012).
33 See generally STONE, supra note 25.
34 I say “supposedly,” because our system has no particular expectation that people with
family wealth will work for a living. Indeed, our lax estate tax policy affirmatively supports the
accumulation of family wealth across generations. See generally MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN
SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH (2005).
30
31
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system failed to provide for people obviously destitute through no fault
of their own. But many people would ask at least as challenging
questions about a welfare system that allowed people who obviously had
the capacity to work to live on benefits financed by others. 35 And if it
becomes too easy to obtain relief, and relief is too generous, the
expectation that people work for a living may unravel. Those who are
especially concerned with maintaining the primacy of the market—
which describes most of the people who have set the political
environment in which welfare policy designers have worked, even if it
does not describe those policy designers themselves—therefore need
some mechanism to ensure that relief is not extended too broadly.
Disability as a trigger for relief has long been thought to solve this
dilemma. People who cannot work because they have disabilities are
understood to be faultless in not working. Similarly, disability has long
been understood by many to be an objective, biomedical category that
can be used to distinguish those with “genuine” impairments from
fakers.
Of course, matters are not so simple. There is a substantial question
whether to attribute fault to those individuals who cannot work because
of disabilities that stemmed in some respect from their own voluntary
choices. One might think here about emphysema or liver cirrhosis—or
quadriplegia that resulted from a drunk driving accident. These
questions substantially complicate the issue of fault. And, far from being
an objective, biomedical determination, the determination of what
constitutes a disability necessarily implicates highly contested questions
of value. 36 The social model of disability tells us that what counts as a
“disability” depends on the interaction between a person’s physical or
mental condition and the physical and institutional structures of the
society in which that person lives. Only when there is an incompatibility
between the person’s condition and those structures—and only when it
is the sort of incompatibility that we believe warrants the (positive and
negative) treatment that we attach to disability—does a biomedical
condition constitute a “disability.” What conditions count as disabilities
thus varies across societies and changes as social, economic, and
political circumstances change.
These complications to the side, disability has long been
understood as a key part of the solution to the problem of providing
social welfare benefits in a market-oriented system. Because disability
35 See Amy L. Wax, Rethinking Welfare Rights: Reciprocity Norms, Reactive Attitudes, and
the Political Economy of Welfare Reform, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257 (2000).
36 See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and Disability, 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 412–
13 (2000); Matthew Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans
with Disabilities Act and Federal Disability Benefit Programs, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1003, 1064 (1998);
Lance Liebman, The Definition of Disability in Social Security and Supplemental Security
Income: Drawing the Bounds of Social Welfare Estates, 89 HARV. L. REV. 833, 853 (1976).
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entitles people to social welfare benefits they would not otherwise have,
it is often thought of as a privileged status in the law. 37 But as the British
and American disability rights movements have argued, this seemingly
privileged status is at best double-edged. 38 Because work is such an
essential part of full membership in the community, social welfare
benefits that exempt individuals from the obligation to work for a living
will often be understood as excluding those individuals from the class of
full citizens. By making disability a ticket out of the workforce,
disability-based social welfare programs make disability a ticket out of
full social citizenship. Marshall’s discussion of the English Poor Laws
aptly describes the social status of those who receive disability-based
welfare: “[t]he Poor Law treated the claims of the poor, not as an
integral part of the rights of the citizen, but as an alternative to them—as
claims which could be met only if the claimants ceased to be citizens in
any true sense of the word.” 39
At times, this denial of full citizenship has been drawn expressly in
the law. Beginning with the 1834 Poor Law, British subjects who
received poor relief were denied the franchise. 40 The Medical Relief
(Disqualification Removal) Act of 1885 gave the right to vote for
Parliament to individuals receiving medical (in today’s terms, disabilitybased) relief, but others receiving poor relief had to wait until 1918 to be
enfranchised. 41 In the United States today, echoes of that earlier practice
of disenfranchisement persist, particularly for individuals who receive
benefits due to mental disabilities and for whom courts have appointed
guardians. 42
At times, the denial of full citizenship has been instantiated in the
practices of government agencies. Caseworkers assessing initial or
continued eligibility for welfare benefits—including disability welfare
benefits—have overridden standard boundaries of privacy. They have
directed individuals with disabilities to undergo particular medical
treatments. They have often disregarded the choices and decisions of
individuals with disabilities themselves. 43 And they have justified these
actions because the disability welfare recipients are living on the public
dole. 44
See STONE, supra note 25, at 28.
See BAGENSTOS, supra note 26, at 23–25; see also STONE, supra note 25, at 173 (“While
official policy elevate[s] the disabled as a class to a special, higher category of citizenship,
private behavior and even official practice often betray contempt for the particular disabled
individual.”).
39 MARSHALL, supra note 21, at 24.
40 See Eric Briggs, The Myth of the Pauper Disqualification, 13 SOC. POL’Y & ADMIN. 138,
138 (1979).
41 See id.
42 See, e.g., Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 2007).
43 See id.
44 See BAGENSTOS, supra note 26, at 22.
37
38
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At times, the denial of full citizenship has resulted from pervasive
social stigma. Whether or not reflected in formal law or the practices of
government agencies, there is a broad public sense that people who rely
on disability welfare are to be suspected of malingering and mooching.
Many members of the public hold to the notion that disability is easily
and often faked, and that it is often used as an excuse to get out of the
ordinary obligations of citizenship. 45 This set of public attitudes is as
much about welfare as it is about disability. People who rely on welfare
or relief have been subjected to stigma since at least the time of the
English Poor Laws. 46 Disability as a trigger for relief might initially be
thought to lessen the stigma—because people understand disability as
objectively determinable and as indicating a lack of fault. But the
reliance on disability as a trigger for relief may actually have the
opposite effect. Associating disability with welfare leads the stigma
attached to welfare recipients to reflect back on people with disabilities
generally. This is a central reason why American disability rights
activists urged a move away from welfare and public benefits as an
approach to disability. 47
However instantiated, social rights for individuals with disabilities
often lead to a loss of social citizenship status for those same individuals.
This is the basic dilemma of categorical social welfare programs in a
market-oriented system. Because disability has so frequently served as a
trigger for receipt of social welfare benefits—and people with disabilities
do in fact rely on those benefits—that dilemma has served as a persistent
obstacle to full citizenship for people with disabilities. The remainder of
this Essay discusses two possible approaches for managing that
dilemma.
III. UNIVERSAL CONTRIBUTORY SOCIAL INSURANCE AS AFFIRMING
CITIZENSHIP?
In his classic work on citizenship and social rights, T.H. Marshall
contended, consistent with the argument I have just made, that poorlaw-type relief deprives its recipients of social citizenship. But, he
argued, universal contributory social insurance provides a solution to
45 See Cary LaCheen, Achy Breaky Pelvis, Lumber Lung and Juggler’s Despair: The Portrayal
of the Americans with Disabilities Act on Television and Radio, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
223 (2000).
46 See MARSHALL, supra note 21, at 24 (“The stigma which clung to poor relief expressed
the deep feelings of a people who understood that those who accepted relief must cross the road
that separated the community of citizens from the outcast company of the destitute.”).
47 I press this point extensively in Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act
as Welfare Reform, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 921 (2003) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Americans with
Disabilities Act].
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this problem. When everyone has the opportunity to pay into a social
insurance program, and benefits are paid to broad subsets of those who
contributed—subsets in which most people can expect to become
members at one point or another—social rights no longer serve a
divisive function in society. Instead of dividing the world into “makers”
and “takers,” to use the language that is popular in American politics
today, Marshall contended that universal, contributory social insurance
binds society together and affirms the social citizenship of those who
receive it. 48 Many of the architects of the American social welfare state
held to a similar view. They believed that “programs for the poor are
poor programs.” 49 When poor people are singled out for particular
benefits, they argued, the beneficiaries become stigmatized and the
benefits become politically vulnerable. 50 They thus argued that, where
possible, welfare programs should be framed as universal, contributory
social insurance schemes. This is the view that underlies the emerging
left-liberal consensus around single-payer health care and the growing
support for a universal basic income and free college programs. 51
Driven by this view, many social welfare programs for people with
disabilities in the United States have taken the form of contributory
social insurance programs. One such program is Social Security Old Age
Insurance, enacted in 1935. That program is not explicitly targeted to
disability or poverty at all. Rather, it provides retirement benefits to
people who have worked and paid into the system for a sufficient period
of time. Yet it is designed in significant respect to provide a living for
those individuals who can no longer be expected to work due to the
disabilities attendant to aging. In 1956, Congress expanded Social
Security to cover disability directly through SSDI—even for those who
had not yet reached the retirement age. 52 In so doing, Congress merely
took the next logical step from its original Old Age Insurance program.
We set the retirement age where we do in part because we believe that
many people will be unable to continue working at that point due to the
48 See MARSHALL, supra note 21, at 56 (“Equalisation is not so much between classes as
between individuals within a population which is now treated for this purpose as though it were
one class. Equality of status is more important than equality of income.”).
49 See MARTHA DERTHICK, POLICYMAKING FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 217 (1979); see also JACOB
S. HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOCIAL
BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES 40 (2002) (calling this belief “ubiquitous” among observers
and policymakers).
50 See William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV.
1431, 1441 (1986).
51 See supra text accompanying notes 5–7. Many supporters of universalism have believed,
however, that the less visible rules of contributory programs can be crafted to achieve
meaningful redistribution without undermining their political goals. See THEDA SKOCPOL,
SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: FUTURE POSSIBILITIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 259–
72 (1995).
52 See EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, DISABLED POLICY: AMERICA’S PROGRAMS FOR THE
HANDICAPPED 73–78 (1987).
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physical and mental conditions that they have acquired through the
years. If an individual who has contributed payroll taxes into the system
acquires those conditions sooner than the average person and as a result
is unable to work, the basic principles of the system suggest that she
should be entitled to “early retirement” benefits. 53
It is the universal, contributory nature of SSDI that is understood
to affirm social citizenship. Because everybody has the chance to pay
into the system, that system sends a message that disability insurance is
not a special privilege for a lucky few, but a basic entitlement of
citizenship. And because people cannot receive SSDI unless they have
paid into the system, the benefits are more readily understood as
insurance that people have paid for, rather than as welfare or a handout.
The universal, contributory structure of SSDI thus frames the system as
a solidaristic response in which each of us pays for protection against
the risks of life that we all face.
But matters are not so simple. Even the universalist, contributory
social insurance form of SSDI threatens in practice to undermine the
social citizenship status of people with disabilities. In part, this is
because the disability category continues to serve, under that program,
as a ticket out of the workforce. Because work remains a key means of
proving oneself a full member of society, anyone who is excused from
working—even if he or she previously did work for a living—risks
substantial stigma. 54
To some extent, the degree of stigma will depend on the cause of
the disability. Those who experience obvious physical disabilities as a
result of military service or other particularly dangerous and important
work may experience social approval and gratification. But even those
individuals will likely experience stigma if they remain out of the
workforce for an extended period of time. And those who have mental
illness or less obvious physical disabilities are often stigmatized—even if
they acquired their conditions through military service or other
dangerous and important work. The fears of fakery and fault compound
the stigma attached to work disability and lead legislators, judges, and
program administrators to narrowly constrict and vigorously guard the
boundaries of the class that is eligible for relief.
Recent media controversies regarding SSDI highlight this problem.
Even though the program is in key respects a system of contributory
social insurance, it has still been the subject of harsh, and to a large
extent unfair, media criticism. That criticism has asserted that SSDI
permits undeserving people to freeload off of the public dole. Criticism
in the media has walked hand in hand with proposals to cut SSDI
benefits and tighten eligibility standards.
53
54

See id. at 41–78.
See generally Bagenstos, supra note 23.

2017]

D I S A B I L I T Y A N D U N I V E R S A LI S M

427

I could pick many recent media stories to highlight here, but,
because it appeared in a stereotypically liberal outlet, an NPR story that
drew wide attention in the middle of the Obama Administration
provides an especially nice example. 55 The piece spoke in alarmist tones
about the “skyrocket[ing]” number of “Americans who are on
Disability.”56 It also expressed great skepticism regarding whether the
“disability” category adequately screens in those who have clearly
defined conditions that prevent them from working—and adequately
screens out those who can work. Thus, the piece discussed the
“squish[iness]” of the disability category. 57 It focused on conditions like
high blood pressure, back pain, and mental illness, which trigger receipt
of SSDI for some people but do not limit others’ ability to work. 58 The
piece also highlighted the way that rates of applications for disability
seem to rise and fall with the strength of the macroeconomy, even
though there is little reason to think that changes in economic
conditions should have such a great effect on working-age individuals’
medical conditions. 59
The NPR story triggered a great deal of discussion and concern
throughout the news media over exploding SSDI rolls. That is not
particularly surprising. In times in which many believe that we face a
fiscal crisis, the piece drew attention to what it presented as a major
contributor to that crisis. Yet the story was unfair in many respects. It
overstated the degree to which SSDI had merely substituted for the Aid
to Families with Dependent Children program that Congress eliminated
in 1996, and it suggested a far greater degree of fraud in claiming or
determining disability than the evidence appears to support. 60 What is
more interesting for my purposes, though, is not the fairness of the NPR
story’s portrayal, but the way the entire controversy demonstrates that
the universal, contributory structure of SSDI does not insulate that
program from being attacked in precisely the same way that a targeted
welfare program is attacked. In earlier budget-cut fights, SSDI was able
to escape the cuts that welfare programs experienced. (As I will discuss
below, though, it is an open question whether this outcome resulted
from the program’s universal, contributory structure or, instead, the
charitable feelings that the public harbors towards people with
55 See Chana Joffe-Walt, Unfit for Work: The Startling Rise of Disability in America, NPR
(Aug. 24, 2017, 11:47 PM), http://apps.npr.org/unfit-for-work.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Harold Pollack, Misleading Trends with Benefits, THE CENTURY FOUND. (Mar. 28, 2013),
http://tcf.org/content/commentary/misleading-trends-with-benefits; see Dean Baker, Planet
Money Misses the Boat on Social Security Disability, CTR. FOR ECON. AND POL’Y RES.: BEAT THE
PRESS (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.cepr.net/index.php/blogs/beat-the-press/planet-moneymisses-the-boat-on-social-security-disability.
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disabilities.) The reaction to the recent NPR story—one echoed in
debates among policymakers and politicians, as well as across the
media—shows the limits of universalism as a strategy to protect the
social citizenship status of recipients of disability benefits. Even if
everyone contributes to the system at some point, those who stop
contributing and start drawing benefits will trigger suspicion regarding
whether they have a sufficiently good excuse for leaving the workforce.
That disability is not a purely objective, medical status, but instead
incorporates value-laden questions involving how to deal with people
who have limited opportunities in the labor market, only heightens the
stigma and suspicion.
The award of cash benefits to individuals who are deemed unable
to work—even those who have contributed to the system in the past—
also leads to paternalism. Thus, the recipients of SSDI benefits have
sometimes been subject to a legal presumption of incompetence. Courts
often find individuals who receive SSDI unqualified for workplace
accommodations under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 61
Benefits are often paid not to the individual with a disability directly but
to a “representative payee,” who has substantial practical control over
the individual’s financial choices. 62 And where the public is paying for
the living expenses of individuals with disabilities, program
administrators feel empowered and entitled to control the day-to-day
lives of those individuals. Jacobus tenBroek and Floyd Matson put the
point starkly: “the recipient is told what he wants as well as how much he
is wanting.”63
Moreover, universal, contributory social insurance cannot provide
all people with disabilities everything they need to become full
participants in society. For one thing, many people acquire disabilities at
birth or during childhood—well before they have an opportunity to
contribute to a social insurance system. The United States has
responded by creating separate means-tested welfare programs for
people who acquire disabilities as children. The SSI program is the most
prominent in this regard. Perhaps not surprisingly, SSI benefits have
been exceptionally politically controversial. Rather than being treated as
a form of universal social insurance, SSI is often treated in public
discourse—even more than is SSDI—as a form of welfare, whose
recipients should be suspected of mooching off of the system. The
recent media discussion of Social Security disability included
61 For a discussion of the case law, see Bagenstos, Americans with Disabilities Act, supra
note 47, at 936–44.
62 See Reid K. Weisbord, Social Security Representative Payee Misuse, 117 PENN. ST. L. REV.
1257 (2013).
63 Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 809, 831 (1966).

2017]

D I S A B I L I T Y A N D U N I V E R S A LI S M

429

exceptionally harsh criticism of SSI. Both the NPR story and a roughly
contemporaneous piece from liberal New York Times columnist
Nicholas Kristof accused parents of making their children do worse in
school so they could be designated as having disabilities and make their
families eligible to receive benefits checks. 64 A long, deeply reported
Washington Post piece recently returned to the same, seemingly
perennial, theme. 65 As one critic of the most recent Post article
explained, the (largely unsupported) suggestion that parents are getting
their children to fake disabilities plays into the hands of those, like the
Trump Administration, who are seeking to adopt a 1990s-style welfare
reform policy for disability insurance. 66
But there is a more fundamental problem with relying on universal,
contributory social insurance programs to affirm the citizenship status
of people with disabilities. Benefits programs such as SSDI and SSI are
ultimately exceptionally limited tools. They can provide for basic human
needs, but only to a limited extent. And they do not assist people with
disabilities to become full contributors to and participants in the
broader society. To do so requires more than cash benefits, and it
requires benefits that are obviously targeted at people with disabilities.
For these reasons, disability rights activists—in the United States and in
the United Kingdom—have harshly criticized a response to disability
that relies on providing cash benefits to those who are deemed unable to
work. They argue that a reliance on such disability welfare programs
“merely ‘buy[s] off’ a potentially troublesome group,” and therefore
relieves pressure to make more fundamental changes to society to
achieve integration and equality. 67 In the terms I am using in this Essay,
disability rights activists argued that cash benefits for disability—
whether through contributory social insurance programs or not—were
an obstacle to full social citizenship. Whether or not one goes so far, it
should be clear that contributory social insurance programs have not
fully integrated people with disabilities into the status of full social
citizens.

64 Nicholas Kristof, Profiting from a Child’s Illiteracy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/opinion/sunday/kristof-profiting-from-a-childs-illiteracy.html;
see Joffe-Walt, supra note 55.
65 See Terrence McCoy, Generations, Disabled, WASH. POST (June 2, 2017), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/sf/local/2017/06/02/generations-disabled/?utm_term=
.5cd5a71efb22.
66 See Rebecca Vallas, The Washington Post’s Reporting on Disability Is Giving Trump Cover
for Disability Cuts, TALK POVERTY (June 2, 2017), https://talkpoverty.org/2017/06/02/
washington-posts-reporting-disability-giving-trump-cover-disability-cuts.
67 BAGENSTOS, supra note 26, at 23.
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IV. PURSUING SOCIAL RIGHTS THAT ADVANCE SOCIAL CITIZENSHIP
But disability rights advocates cannot abandon disability-based
benefits. Because of workplace discrimination, inaccessible facilities, and
failure to provide reasonable accommodations—if not because of the
disabilities themselves—many people with disabilities are unable to find
work on the competitive market. Cash benefits will, accordingly, remain
necessary for the foreseeable future. And, for many people with
disabilities, to enter the workforce will itself require substantial public
investment: in health insurance, to remove the most significant obstacle
to employment for people with disabilities; in personal assistance
services, to assist people with disabilities to get out of bed and to work;
in assistive technology, to enable people with disabilities to perform
work-related tasks; and in accessible transportation, to enable people
with disabilities to get to the workplace in the first place. 68 (The Trump
Administration’s various health care proposals all would slash the
funding for these important benefits.) All of these public investments
are well understood as social rights.
Indeed, even the requirement of workplace accommodation might
well be understood as a form of social rights. The line between civil and
social rights, as I previously noted, has always been a contested and
changing one. Disability rights activists have long argued that the
requirement of workplace accommodation is best understood as a civil
right that represents nothing more than the application of
nondiscrimination principles to disabilities. 69 And, indeed, there are
substantial congruences between nondiscrimination requirements like
those regarding race and sex and accommodation requirements for
disability. For one thing, as many disability rights activists argue,
employers accommodate valued (nondisabled) employees all the time. 70
They provide chairs for employees to sit in, desks that fit the typically
sized nondisabled employee, and so forth. Employers also often provide
many individualized accommodations for particular nondisabled
employees. A workplace that took people with disabilities seriously as
potential workers would extend similar accommodations to the
disability context. It would not, for example, have an entrance that can
be traversed only by stairs. And it would include desks and equipment
to accommodate its employees with disabilities, just as it includes desks
See BAGENSTOS, supra note 26, at 128–29.
Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as
Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004). For extensive efforts to establish the
substantive point, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and
the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003) [hereinafter Bagenstos,
Rational Discrimination].
70 Bagenstos, Rational Discrimination, supra note 69.
68
69
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and equipment that accommodate its nondisabled employees. Although
this might entail some additional costs, even basic antidiscrimination
laws require employers to assume additional costs in the interest of
promoting an integrated workplace. 71
Nonetheless, requirements of workplace accommodation often feel
quite different than more traditional antidiscrimination requirements.
In many of their applications, accommodation requirements demand
that employers treat individuals with disabilities differently than they do
other employees. Some of the exclusion of people with disabilities from
the workplace can be cured by universal design. A workplace with a
ramp and no stairs at the front treats people with disabilities identically
to people without disabilities and is accessible to all, for example. But
some exclusions cannot be overcome without individualized
accommodation. For example, it may be impossible to design a
workplace so that all file cabinets are within reach of a person who uses
a wheelchair. In such circumstances, a wheelchair user who applies for a
secretarial job might demand and be granted an exemption from the
requirement that the incumbent engage in filing (at least if filing is not
too central a task for the particular job). The filing task will then be
reallocated to another worker, who may resent what she understands as
the special treatment that the wheelchair-using worker receives.
The dilemma remains significant. In order to participate fully in
community life—including, notably, the workforce—many people with
disabilities need to rely on government interventions. Those
interventions include health care provision, personal assistance services,
accessible
technology and
transportation, and
workplace
nondiscrimination and accommodation requirements. But those very
government interventions can readily be understood by the public as
“special rights,” which are highly vulnerable in the political process, are
narrowly and grudgingly administered, and ultimately undermine the
goal of achieving full social citizenship for people with disabilities. 72
The disability rights movement has sought to avoid this dilemma
through a clever reframing strategy—a strategy that has had real, though
limited, success. That strategy was to invoke and redefine the concept of
independence. Instead of speaking of physical independence, disability
rights movement advocates urged that what was more important was
decisional independence—“the ability of people with disabilities to make
their own choices concerning how to live their lives, what services to

69.

71

I explore these points in some detail in Bagenstos, Rational Discrimination, supra note

72 Peter J. Rubin, Equal Rights, Special Rights, and the Nature of Antidiscrimination Law, 97
MICH. L. REV. 564 (1998). On the political difficulties confronted by those who seek rights
characterized as “special,” see Karen Engle, What’s So Special About Special Rights?, 75 DENV.
U. L. REV. 1265 (1998).
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receive, and how and where to receive them.” 73 “[A]ssistance in personal
hygiene, transportation, or other activities,” far from compromising
decisional independence, actually promotes it, “so long as those who
provide the assistance are subject to the control and direction of the
individuals with disabilities who receive it.” 74 This notion of
independence, as an organizing principle or frame for the disability
rights movement’s arguments, played a key role in developing support
for the movement during the 1980s. Civil rights policy was becoming
increasingly controversial in American politics at that time, with great
suspicion regarding the extension of new civil rights. Deregulatory
positions were ascendant as well, and so were efforts to cut the federal
budget. In this political context, the independence frame gave disability
rights activists a tool with which to argue for additional rights and
services without suggesting that they were merely extending the already
controversial civil rights project still further. Whatever costs attended to
disability accommodations, movement activists argued, would be more
than offset by the financial benefit to society of avoiding the need for
disability welfare—not to mention the moral benefit to individuals with
disabilities of enabling them to make their own way in the world and
avoid dependence. 75 In that time of mythical welfare queens, the utility
of such an argumentative frame was readily apparent.
Independent living has offered a frame to justify a broad array of
social rights provisions—including in the areas of antidiscrimination
accommodation, health care, personal assistance services,
transportation, and others. But much of its success has depended on two
baseline premises. One premise is that the United States will, for
charitable or humanitarian reasons if nothing else, provide costly
benefits programs to those people with disabilities who cannot make
their own living in our current system. The other premise is that the
interventions that serve independence will cost less than the benefits
payments that they avert. Only if these two premises hold will the fiscal
arguments for government intervention for people with disabilities have
sufficient traction. And it is the fiscal arguments that have been the key
to the political success of the independence frame. They played a crucial
role in securing the enactment of the ADA. 76 They also have helped to
promote deinstitutionalization of individuals with various disabilities
and in recent years the creation of robust infrastructures of communitybased services to enable those individuals to participate more fully in
civic life. 77
73
74
75
76
77

BAGENSTOS, supra note 26, at 25.
Id.
See Bagenstos, Americans with Disabilities Act, supra note 47.
Id.
See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Past and Future of Deinstitutionalization Litigation, 34
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But the two key underlying premises highlight the limitations and
threat of the fiscal arguments that underlie the success of the disability
rights movement’s independence frame. The first premise—that the
United States will continue to provide costly welfare benefits for people
with disabilities who cannot make their own living—has largely proven
true up to this point. To the extent that it is true, however, is because
many members of the public continue to have a view of people with
disabilities as the proper recipients of charity—as the paradigm of the
deserving rather than the undeserving poor. 78 It was precisely that
public attitude that the disability rights movement challenged as itself
denying equal citizenship status to people with disabilities. But the
success of the independence frame, paradoxically, depends on people
continuing to hold that attitude. As I suggested earlier, when disability
advocates defeated efforts to roll back Social Security disability
programs in the 1980s, they were successful in significant part because
political actors and the public were disposed to offer charity to
individuals with disabilities. 79
Moreover, there are good reasons to think this first premise will
prove increasingly shaky. SSDI rolls continue to expand, largely because
the 2007–2009 recession drove a massive increase in unemployment,
and the post-2009 recovery has done much more for those at the top of
the income distribution than for those at the bottom. Workforce
participation for individuals with disabilities dropped far more during
the recession than for nondisabled individuals. Since then, workforce
participation has recovered far less for those with disabilities than for
those without them. 80 As the disability rolls continue to expand, and
fiscal pressure—particularly surrounding “entitlement” programs like
Social Security—creates increased pressures for retrenchment, programs
of largesse for people with disabilities are likely to be far less secure. The
Trump Administration, and its Republican allies in Congress, have
made that clear. Their health care legislation—which at this writing
looks like a zombie, not exactly alive but never fully dead—slashes
Medicaid programs on which disabled people rely. And the Trump
Administration’s budget proposes a major retrenchment in cash
disability benefits. If Congress follows through on these cuts, the
workplace accommodations and other interventions that are sold as
avoiding the need for disability benefits will look more expensive, and
less attractive, by comparison.
Moreover, the second premise—that the interventions necessary to
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2012).
78 See BAGENSTOS, supra note 26 at 24, 144.
79 See id.
80 For recent statistics, see SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 170–71 (2d ed. 2014).
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enable people with disabilities to participate fully in the community are
relatively cheap—is only true up to a point. When that point is reached,
the independence frame will no longer succeed in promoting socialrights interventions for people with disabilities. And, unfortunately, that
point is very much in sight in key areas of disability policy. As deeprooted structural barriers like the organization of our health care
system, the lack of accessible transit and assistive technology, and the
failure to provide personal assistance services become ever more
important, the cost of integrating individuals with disabilities into the
workplace will rise. As it does so, the fiscal arguments for
accommodation and integration will lose their political force, and
support for social rights for people with disabilities can be expected to
slacken.
CONCLUSION: UNIVERSALISM IS NO PANACEA
What lessons can left-liberals developing social policy positions in
the age of Trump take from this discussion? One overriding lesson is
that universalism in social welfare policy is not a political panacea. SSDI
is a universal program, in most senses in which analysts typically use the
term in social policy. Everyone who works pays into the program, and
everyone who pays into the program is entitled to collect benefits if the
insurable event—disability—occurs. In these respects, just like Old Age
Insurance, SSDI is a classic universal, contributory program.
But that is not the perception—at least among many political
actors. Rather than considering matters ex ante—when everyone who
works pay into the program and thus becomes eligible to collect—public
debate over SSDI takes an ex post perspective and considers matters
from the point at which an individual collects benefits. At that point, the
people who are collecting the benefits do look very different from those
who are not. People who receive SSDI are out of the workforce. They are
collecting, not financing, benefits. Those who remain at work, by
contrast, are financing, rather than collecting, benefits. If one is so
inclined, it is easy at that point to see those who are on disability as
“takers,” and those who are being paid for by the “makers.” Because
disability has been so stigmatized, the ex post “makers”-“takers”
perspective is especially salient for many observers. It is no surprise,
then, that many people look past the universal, contributory features of
SSDI and focus principally on the moment at which the program grants
its benefits to a particular class of people.
Some might argue that the SSDI experience has limited
implications for the universal programs that are becoming the
consensus proposals of left-liberal policy analysts. In particular, one
might argue that the problem with SSDI is precisely that it is not truly
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universal. Everyone (who works) may pay into SSDI, but not everyone
will benefit from it. Single-payer health care, one might say, is very
different, because (basically) everyone uses health insurance. Even if
SSDI has not achieved the political benefits of universalism, the
argument goes, single-payer will, because single-payer is truly universal.
But it all depends on your frame of reference. As with SSDI, ex ante
and ex post perspectives suggest very different conclusions regarding
the universalism of a single-payer program. Ex ante, everybody is
insured under single-payer—but essentially the same is true of SSDI. Ex
post—once the insurable event occurs—some beneficiaries of singlepayer health care are going to receive more than others. If a person
contracts a condition like cancer for which treatment is very expensive,
or if a person acquires a chronic disease or disability that requires
treatment or services over a long period of time, that person will receive
a greater allocation of health care resources than a person who never
experiences an expensive condition. In this sense, single-payer is like
SSDI. One lesson we learned from the political and legal debate over the
Affordable Care Act is that many people view health insurance in
precisely these terms: many people who have not yet experienced an
expensive medical condition resent what they understand as being
forced to pay for the health care of others. In the terms Deborah Stone
used in a very perceptive article, many people view health insurance as
governed by the distributive principle of “actuarial fairness” rather than
by the “solidarity principle.” 81 There is reason to doubt that framing a
national health care program as universal will overcome that dynamic.
To the contrary, I would suggest, the fact that so many Americans
adhere to the actuarial fairness principle will lead them to see even a
single-payer program as not truly universal.
Just as in the SSDI context, stigma and judgments about moral
desert will play a major role in shaping public attitudes about a singlepayer health plan. If the program spends large amounts of money on
conditions that are stigmatized, or are widely understood to result from
poor personal choices, it will be more likely to be seen as a transfer from
the deserving to the undeserving than as a universal guarantee for
everyone. Moreover, the construction of any health insurance program
will require choices about just what conditions it will insure against,
what treatments it will reimburse, and what limitations it will place on
coverage, whether in general or in particular cases. These choices will
further complicate the effort to frame such a program as universal.
And there is yet another way in which assessments of a singlepayer program’s universalism depend on one’s frame of reference. Even
if a single-payer program appears universal once it is in place—despite
81 Deborah A. Stone, The Struggle for the Soul of Health Insurance, 18 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y
& L. 287 (1993).
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the reasons for skepticism I have just laid out—it will not appear
universal when compared to the status quo ante. As many analysts have
noted, a fundamental political obstacle to the United States moving
toward universal health care has been the uneven way in which our prereform health care system provides insurance. 82 Most Americans receive
health insurance through their jobs, and many are reasonably satisfied
with that insurance. A single-payer program won’t look especially
universal to them. Rather, they will see a single-payer program as taking
something from them to give something to others—as taking away their
current, reasonably satisfactory insurance in order to provide insurance
to people who currently don’t have it. To the extent that people who
newly receive insurance are not working—or working in only
contingent jobs—those with stable jobs who lose their current health
insurance are especially unlikely to see single-payer in solidaristic terms.
That is another lesson of the disability context—because of the high
normative value the American public places on work, benefits programs
are likely to be received more skeptically the more they are disconnected
from work.
None of this is an argument against a single-payer system on the
merits. And I certainly do not intend to endorse the normative
argument for tying basic health benefits to work. In a country as wealthy
as the United States, I believe that health care is a basic human right that
should be enjoyed by everyone, period. But the supposed political
benefits of single-payer health care—or other universal programs—are
less than meets the eye. Left-liberals should not be deterred from
advocating broad social policies like single-payer that will have good
substantive results and instantiate our moral commitments. But we
should do so with a recognition that the politics are unlikely to be
simple.

82 Jacob S. Hacker, The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and
Sequence in the Development of British, Canadian, and U.S. Medical Policy, 12 STUD. AM. POL.
DEV. 57, 125 (1998) (describing political obstacles to President Clinton’s health reform efforts);
see, e.g., Harold Pollack, Medicare for All—If It Were Politically Possible—Would Necessarily
Replicate the Defects of Our Current System, 40 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 921 (2015).

